uw-ssec/supply-chain-security
Supply-chain security plugin for research software. 2 agents (lead expert + incident responder), 5 commands (audit, incident, lockfile-check, pin-actions, harden-workflow), 6 skills covering hardened CI/CD, dependency security, threat awareness, SBOM/provenance, incident response, and ecosystem-specific quirks (npm, PyPI, conda/pixi, cargo, Go). Covers 2025-2026 campaigns: Shai-Hulud, TeamPCP, axios, LiteLLM .pth persistence.
Dependency and lockfile supply-chain security review with 2025–2026 attack campaign patterns. Use when reviewing package.json, pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, pixi.toml, conda-lock.yml, or any lockfile; when evaluating a new dependency for addition; or when responding to a supply-chain compromise incident. Contains patterns for detecting maintainer-account-takeover style attacks that CVE scanners miss.
Ecosystem-specific supply-chain gotchas for npm, PyPI, conda/pixi, cargo, and Go. Use when reviewing package.json + .npmrc, pyproject.toml + setup.py, pixi.toml + conda-lock.yml, Cargo.toml + .cargo/config.toml, or go.mod + GOPROXY config — any time a supply-chain recommendation depends on which ecosystem you're in. Loads ecosystem-specific reference docs on demand.
Hardened GitHub Actions release workflow patterns for supply-chain security. Use when reviewing or writing GitHub Actions release workflows (.github/workflows/*.yml). Contains SHA-pinning, OIDC trusted publishing, two-job build/publish split, --ignore-scripts, Pwn Request prevention, deny-by-default permissions, and egress hardening patterns. Triggered by March 2026 TeamPCP campaign that specifically hijacked release tags.
Incident-response runbook for supply-chain compromises. Use when an advisory, CVE, GHSA, or campaign report names a dependency or GitHub Action this project uses; when responding to a Shai-Hulud-style maintainer takeover; or when a TeamPCP-style tag hijack is reported. Walks the lockfile-check → CI-cache-check → secret-rotation → persistence-artifact-hunt 4-point check end-to-end.
SBOM generation and provenance verification for research software releases. Use when reviewing or writing release workflows that publish to PyPI, npm, GHCR, or similar registries; when verifying a downstream artifact's signatures or attestations; or when evaluating SLSA level for a release pipeline. Covers CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM generation with syft, Sigstore keyless signing with cosign, npm provenance, and SLSA build levels.
Supply chain threat posture assessment for projects and packages. Use when reviewing a project's .github/workflows/*.yml, package.json, pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, pixi.toml, or lockfiles for exposure to active 2025–2026 campaigns. Covers Shai-Hulud (500+ npm packages), TeamPCP (Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Bitwarden CLI, SAP CAP via tag hijacking), axios (100M weekly downloads), and LiteLLM .pth persistence — all attack patterns CVE scanners miss.