open-coder-ai/verify-mcp-allowlist

{
  "$schema": "https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.0.0/plugin.schema.json",
  "name": "verify-mcp-allowlist",
  "version": "0.0.1",
  "description": "Gate MCP server configuration as protected content. A shell write to .mcp.json is refused unless every mcpServers entry on the line matches a name+source pair on the allowlist -- an unlisted name blocks, and an allowed name whose command/args/url changed blocks too (catches a server renamed to an allowed name but pointed elsewhere). The allowlist ships inside this guard's own script, protected like every policy's implementations/ source -- edit only with 'chock: approved-config-change'. Claude Code's .mcp.json only: agentseam 0.2.1 records no per-vendor MCP config path, so other agents are left out, not guessed at. Tool-time (Bash) only, best-effort: PreToolUse fails open on a crash, a file-write tool bypasses this guard, a write with no visible content fails closed. No commit-time gate -- chock 0.8.0 has no gate kind pairing name+source against an external allowlist. Matching and path checks are exact-string and substring-coarse. No pragma for .mcp.json -- matching the allowlist is the only way through.",
  "author": {
    "name": "chock-core"
  },
  "repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "keywords": [
    "chock",
    "policy-as-code",
    "rule",
    "advise",
    "{'control': 'asi04', 'coverage': 'partial', 'note': \"blocks an unverified mcp server entering .mcp.json from the shell -- the mechanizable slice of asi04's 'unverified mcp servers' framing; provenance and signature verification beyond allowlist membership stay with the advisory owasp-asi04-agentic-supply-chain policy\"}"
  ],
  "extensions": {
    "io.github.open-coder-ai": {
      "manifest": "manifest.yaml",
      "artifact": "rule",
      "enforcement": "advise",
      "coverage_without_chock": "advisory"
    }
  }
}